الحرب الصينية الهندية

(تم التحويل من Sino-Indian War)
Sino-Indian War
China India Locator (1959).svg
The Sino-Indian War was fought between India and China.
التاريخ20 October[1] – 21 November 1962
(1 months and 1 days)
الموقع
النتيجة Chinese victory[2][3]
الخصوم
 الهند  الصين
القادة والزعماء
Brij Mohan Kaul
(Chief of General Staff of the Indian Army)
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
(President of India)
Jawaharlal Nehru
(Prime Minister of India)
V. K. Krishna Menon
(Defence Minister of India)
General Pran Nath Thapar
(Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army)
Luo Ruiqing (chief of PLA staff)[4]
Zhang Guohua (field commander)[4]
Mao Zedong
(Chairman of the Communist Party of China)
Liu Shaoqi
(President of the People's Republic of China)[5]
Zhou Enlai
(Premier of the People's Republic of China)
Lin Biao
(Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China)
Liu Bocheng
(Marshal of PLA)
الخسائر
1,383 killed
1,696 missing
548–1,047 wounded
3,968 captured[6][7]
722 killed
1,697 wounded[6][8]
Example.of.complex.text.rendering.svg
هذه المقالة تحتوي على Indic text. بدون دعم العرض المناصب، فقد ترى question marks or boxes, misplaced vowels or missing conjuncts بدلاً من Indic text.

The Sino-Indian War, also known as the Indo-China War and Sino-Indian Border Conflict, was a war between China and India that occurred in 1962. A disputed Himalayan border was the main pretext for war, but other issues played a role. There had been a series of violent border incidents after the 1959 Tibetan uprising, when India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. India initiated a Forward Policy in which it placed outposts along the border, including several north of the McMahon Line, the eastern portion of the Line of Actual Control proclaimed by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in 1959.

Unable to reach political accommodation on disputed territory along the 3,225 kilometre- (2,000 mile-) long Himalayan border,[9] the Chinese launched simultaneous offensives in Ladakh and across the McMahon Line on 20 October 1962. Chinese troops advanced over Indian forces in both theatres, capturing Rezang La in Chushul in the western theatre, as well as Tawang in the eastern theatre. The war ended when China declared a ceasefire on 20 November 1962, and simultaneously announced its withdrawal to its claimed 'line of actual control'.

Much of the battle took place in harsh mountain conditions, entailing large-scale combat at altitudes of over 4,000 metres (14,000 feet).[10] The Sino-Indian War was also noted for the non-deployment of the air force by either the Chinese or Indian side.

The buildup and offensive from China occurred concurrently with the 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis (16–28 October 1962) that saw the United States and the Soviet Union confronting each other, and India did not receive assistance from either of these world powers until the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved. It was the first war between India and China. Following the end of the war, a number of small clashes broke out between both sides, but no large-scale fighting ensued.

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Location

Pre-Simla British map published in 1909 shows the so-called "Outer Line" as India's northern boundary.
Postal Map of China published by the Government of China in 1917

China and India shared a long border, sectioned into three stretches by Nepal, Sikkim (then an Indian protectorate), and Bhutan, which follows the Himalayas between Burma and what was then West Pakistan. A number of disputed regions lie along this border. At its western end is the Aksai Chin region, an area the size of Switzerland, that sits between the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang and Tibet (which China declared as an autonomous region in 1965). The eastern border, between Burma and Bhutan, comprises the present Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (formerly the North East Frontier Agency). Both of these regions were overrun by China in the 1962 conflict.

Most combat took place at high altitudes. The Aksai Chin region is a desert of salt flats around 5,000 metres (16,000 feet) above sea level, and Arunachal Pradesh is mountainous with a number of peaks exceeding 7,000 metres (23,000 feet). The Chinese Army had possession of one of the highest ridges in the regions. The high altitude and freezing conditions also caused logistical and welfare difficulties; in past similar conflicts (such as the Italian Campaign of World War I) harsh conditions have caused more casualties than have enemy action. The Sino-Indian War was no different, with many troops on both sides dying in the freezing cold.[11]


Background

The main cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China's construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict.

Aksai Chin

Traditional borders of Jammu and Kashmir (CIA map). The northern boundary is along the Karakash valley. Aksai Chin is the shaded region in the east.
1878 British map, with trade routes between Ladakh and Tarim Basin marked. The border preferred by British Indian Empire, shown in two-toned purple and pink, included the Aksai Chin and narrowed down to the Yarkand River.

The western portion of the Sino-Indian boundary originated in 1834, with the conquest of Ladakh by the armies of Raja Gulab Singh (Dogra) under the suzerainty of the Sikh Empire. Following an unsuccessful campaign into Tibet, Gulab Singh and the Tibetans signed a treaty in 1842 agreeing to stick to the "old, established frontiers", which were left unspecified.[12][13] The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in the transfer of the Jammu and Kashmir region including Ladakh to the British, who then installed Gulab Singh as the Maharaja under their suzerainty. British commissioners contacted Chinese officials to negotiate the border, who did not show any interest.[14] The British boundary commissioners fixed the southern end of the boundary at Pangong Lake, but regarded the area north of it till the Karakoram Pass as terra incognita.[15]


خط مكماهون

خط مكماهون هو الخط الأحمر الذي يميز الحد الشمالي للمنطقة المتنازع عليها.

Events leading up to war


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Tibet and the border dispute

The 1940s saw huge change with the Partition of India in 1947 (resulting in the establishment of the two new states of India and Pakistan), and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the Chinese Civil War in 1949. One of the most basic policies for the new Indian government was that of maintaining cordial relations with China, reviving its ancient friendly ties. India was among the first nations to grant diplomatic recognition to the newly created PRC.[16]

At the time, Chinese officials issued no condemnation of Nehru's claims or made any opposition to Nehru's open declarations of control over Aksai Chin. In 1956, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated that he had no claims over Indian-controlled territory.[16] He later argued that Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction and that the McCartney-MacDonald Line was the line China could accept.[17][18] Zhou later argued that as the boundary was undemarcated and had never been defined by treaty between any Chinese or Indian government, the Indian government could not unilaterally define Aksai Chin's borders.[19]

In 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army took control of Tibet, which all Chinese governments regarded as still part of China. Later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956–67[10] and placing border posts in Aksai Chin.[20] India found out after the road was completed, protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border.[16] To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border.[16] The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,[16] and in 1951 and 1952, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.[16]

In 1954, Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo calling for India's borders to be clearly defined and demarcated;[21] in line with previous Indian philosophy, Indian maps showed a border that, in some places, lay north of the McMahon Line.[22] Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in November 1956, again repeated Chinese assurances that the People's Republic had no claims on Indian territory, although official Chinese maps showed 120,000 kiloمتر مربعs (46,000 ميل2) of territory claimed by India as Chinese.[16] CIA documents created at the time revealed that Nehru had ignored Burmese premier Ba Swe when he warned Nehru to be cautious when dealing with Zhou.[23] They also allege that Zhou purposefully told Nehru that there were no border issues with India.[23]

In 1954, China and India negotiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the slogan Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was popular then. Nehru in 1958 had privately told G. Parthasarathi, the Indian envoy to China not to trust the Chinese at all and send all communications directly to him, bypassing the Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon since his communist background clouded his thinking about China.[24] According to Georgia Tech scholar John W Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.[4]

This apparent progress in relations suffered a major setback when, in 1959, Nehru accommodated the Tibetan religious leader at the time, the 14th Dalai Lama, who fled Lhasa after a failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule. The Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, was enraged and asked the Xinhua News Agency to produce reports on Indian expansionists operating in Tibet.[بحاجة لمصدر]

Border incidents continued through this period. In August 1959, the People's Liberation Army took an Indian prisoner at Longju, which had an ambiguous position in the McMahon Line,[10][22][25] and two months later in Aksai Chin, a clash at Kongka Pass led to the death of nine Indian frontier policemen.[20]

On 2 October, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev defended Nehru in a meeting with Chairman Mao. This action reinforced China's impression that the Soviet Union, the United States and India all had expansionist designs on China. The People's Liberation Army went so far as to prepare a self-defence counterattack plan.[4] Negotiations were restarted between the nations, but no progress was made.[21][26]

As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line, China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory.[27] In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet.[4] Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin, a position supported by the international community.[18] India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate.[بحاجة لمصدر] China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".[4] India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China.

1960 meetings to resolve the boundary question

In 1960, based on an agreement between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, officials from India and China held discussions in order to settle the boundary dispute.[28][29] China and India disagreed on the major watershed that defined the boundary in the western sector.[30] The Chinese statements with respect to their border claims often misrepresented the cited sources.[31]


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The Forward Policy

At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B. M. Kaul as army Chief of General Staff,[32] but he refused to increase military spending and prepare for a possible war.[32][المصدر لا يؤكد ذلك] According to James Barnard Calvin of the U.S. Navy, in 1959, India started sending Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This program created both border skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China.[10] The aim of this policy was to create outposts behind advancing Chinese troops to interdict their supplies, forcing them north of the disputed line.[10][16][25][33][34] There were eventually 60 such outposts, including 43 north of the McMahon Line, to which India claimed sovereignty.[10][21] China viewed this as further confirmation of Indian expansionist plans directed towards Tibet. According to the Indian official history, implementation of the Forward Policy was intended to provide evidence of Indian occupation in the previously unoccupied region through which Chinese troops had been advancing. Kaul was confident, through contact with Indian Intelligence and CIA information, that China would not react with force.[18] Indeed, at first the PLA simply withdrew, but eventually Chinese forces began to counter-encircle the Indian positions which clearly encroached into the north of McMahon Line. This led to a tit-for-tat Indian reaction, with each force attempting to outmanoeuver the other. Despite the escalating nature of the dispute, the two forces withheld from engaging each other directly.[4]

Chinese attention was diverted for a time by the military activity of the Nationalists on Taiwan, but on 23 June the U.S. assured China that a Nationalist invasion would not be permitted.[35] China's heavy artillery facing Taiwan could then be moved to Tibet.[36] It took China six to eight months to gather the resources needed for the war, according to Anil Athale, author of the official Indian history.[36] The Chinese sent a large quantity of non-military supplies to Tibet through the Indian port of Calcutta.[36]

Early incidents

Various border conflicts and "military incidents" between India and China flared up throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In May, the Indian Air Force was told not to plan for close air support, although it was assessed as being a feasible way to counter the unfavourable ratio of Chinese to Indian troops.[37] In June, a skirmish caused the deaths of dozens of Chinese troops. The Indian Intelligence Bureau received information about a Chinese buildup along the border which could be a precursor to war.[37]

During June–July 1962, Indian military planners began advocating "probing actions" against the Chinese, and accordingly, moved mountain troops forward to cut off Chinese supply lines. According to Patterson, the Indian motives were threefold:

  1. Test Chinese resolve and intentions regarding India.
  2. Test whether India would enjoy Soviet backing in the event of a Sino-Indian war.
  3. Create sympathy for India within the U.S., with whom relations had deteriorated after the Indian annexation of Goa.[38]:279

Involvement of other nations

During the conflict, Nehru wrote two desperate letters to U.S. President John F. Kennedy, requesting 12 squadrons of fighter jets and a modern radar system. These jets were seen as necessary to beef up Indian air strength so that air-to-air combat could be initiated safely from the Indian perspective (bombing troops was seen as unwise for fear of Chinese retaliatory action). Nehru also asked that these aircraft be manned by American pilots until Indian airmen were trained to replace them. These requests were rejected by the Kennedy Administration (which was involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis during most of the Sino-Indian War). The U.S. nonetheless provided non-combat assistance to Indian forces and planned to send the carrier USS Kitty Hawk to the Bay of Bengal to support India in case of an air war.[39]

Some reports suggest a contradictory response from the U.S. According to former Indian diplomat G. Parthasarathy, "only after we got nothing from the US did arms supplies from the Soviet Union to India commence."[40] In 1962, President of Pakistan Ayub Khan made clear to India that Indian troops could safely be transferred from the Pakistan frontier to the Himalayas.[41]

Aftermath

China

According to the China's official military history, the war achieved China's policy objectives of securing borders in its western sector, as China retained de facto control of the Aksai Chin. After the war, India abandoned the Forward Policy, and the de facto borders stabilised along the Line of Actual Control.

According to James Calvin of Marine Corps Command and Staff College, even though China won a military victory it lost in terms of its international image.[10] China's first nuclear weapon test in October 1964 and its support of Pakistan in the 1965 India Pakistan War tended to confirm the American view of communist world objectives, including Chinese influence over Pakistan.[10]

Lora Saalman opined in a study of Chinese military publications, that while the war led to much blame, debates and ultimately acted as causation of military modernisation of India but the war is now treated as basic reportage of facts with relatively diminished interest by Chinese analysts.[42]

India

U.S. Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith and Prime Minister Nehru conferring at the time of the conflict. This photograph was taken by the United States Information Service (USIS) and sent to President John F. Kennedy with a letter from Galbraith dated 9 November 1962.

The aftermath of the war saw sweeping changes in the Indian military to prepare it for similar conflicts in the future, and placed pressure on Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who was seen as responsible for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack on India. Indians reacted with a surge in patriotism and memorials were erected for many of the Indian troops who died in the war. Arguably, the main lesson India learned from the war was the need to strengthen its own defences and a shift from Nehru's foreign policy with China based on his stated concept of "brotherhood". Because of India's inability to anticipate Chinese aggression, Prime Minister Nehru faced harsh criticism from government officials, for having promoted pacifist relations with China.[18] Indian President Radhakrishnan said that Nehru's government was naive and negligent about preparations, and Nehru admitted his failings.[43] According to Inder Malhotra, a former editor of The Times of India and a commentator for The Indian Express, Indian politicians invested more effort in removing Defence Minister Krishna Menon than in actually waging war.[43] Krishna Menon's favoritism weakened the Indian Army, and national morale dimmed.[43] The public saw the war as a political and military debacle.[43] Under American advice (by American envoy John Kenneth Galbraith who made and ran American policy on the war as all other top policy makers in the US were absorbed in coincident Cuban Missile Crisis[44]) Indians refrained, not according to the best choices available, from using the Indian air force to beat back the Chinese advances. The CIA later revealed that at that time the Chinese had neither the fuel nor runways long enough for using their air force effectively in Tibet.[43] Indians in general became highly sceptical of China and its military. Many Indians view the war as a betrayal of India's attempts at establishing a long-standing peace with China and started to question the once popular "Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai" (meaning "Indians and Chinese are brothers"). The war also put an end to Nehru's earlier hopes that India and China would form a strong Asian Axis to counteract the increasing influence of the Cold War bloc superpowers.[4]

The unpreparedness of the army was blamed on Defence Minister Menon, who resigned his government post to allow for someone who might modernise India's military further. India's policy of weaponisation via indigenous sources and self-sufficiency was thus cemented. Sensing a weakened army, Pakistan, a close ally of China, began a policy of provocation against India by infiltrating Jammu and Kashmir and ultimately triggering the Second Kashmir War with India in 1965 and Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. The Attack of 1965 was successfully stopped and ceasefire was negotiated under international pressure.[45] In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 India won a clear victory, resulting in liberation of Bangladesh (formerly East-Pakistan).[46][47]

As a result of the war, the Indian government commissioned an investigation, resulting in the classified Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report on the causes of the war and the reasons for failure. India's performance in high-altitude combat in 1962 led to an overhaul of the Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment. Neville Maxwell claimed that the Indian role in international affairs after the border war was also greatly reduced after the war and India's standing in the non-aligned movement suffered.[18] The Indian government has attempted to keep the Hendersen-Brooks-Bhagat Report secret for decades, although portions of it have recently been leaked by Neville Maxwell.[48]

According to James Calvin, an analyst from the U.S. Navy, India gained many benefits from the 1962 conflict. This war united the country as never before. India got 32,000 square miles (8.3 million hectares, 83,000 km2) of disputed territory even if it felt that NEFA was hers all along. The new Indian republic had avoided international alignments; by asking for help during the war, India demonstrated its willingness to accept military aid from several sectors. And, finally, India recognised the serious weaknesses in its army. It would more than double its military manpower in the next two years and it would work hard to resolve the military's training and logistic problems to later become the second-largest army in the world. India's efforts to improve its military posture significantly enhanced its army's capabilities and preparedness.[10] This played a role in subsequent wars against Pakistan.

Internment and deportation of Chinese Indians

Soon after the end of the war, the Indian government passed the Defence of India Act in December 1962,[49] permitting the "apprehension and detention in custody of any person [suspected] of being of hostile origin." The broad language of the act allowed for the arrest of any person simply for having a Chinese surname, Chinese ancestry or a Chinese spouse.[50] The Indian government incarcerated thousands of Chinese-Indians in an internment camp in Deoli, Rajasthan, where they were held for years without trial. The last internees were not released until 1967. Thousands more Chinese-Indians were forcibly deported or coerced to leave India. Nearly all internees had their properties sold off or looted.[49] Even after their release, the Chinese Indians faced many restrictions in their freedom. They could not travel freely until the mid-1990s.[49]

Later conflicts

India also reported some military conflicts with China after the 1962 war. In late 1967, there were two incidents in which both countries exchanged fire in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La incident", and the other being "Chola incident" in which advancing Chinese forces were forced to withdraw from Sikkim, then a protectorate of India and later a state of India after annexation in 1975. In the 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish, both sides showed military restraint and it was a bloodless conflict. In 2017 the two countries once again were involved in a military standoff, in which several troops were injured.

Diplomatic process

In 1993 and 1996, the two sides signed the Sino-Indian Bilateral Peace and Tranquility Accords, agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LoAC). Ten meetings of a Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group have taken place to determine where the LoAC lies, but little progress has occurred.

On 20 November 2006, Indian politicians from Arunachal Pradesh expressed their concern over Chinese military modernization and appealed to parliament to take a harder stance on the PRC following a military buildup on the border similar to that in 1962.[51] Additionally, China's military aid to Pakistan as well is a matter of concern to the Indian public,[52] as the two sides have engaged in various wars.

On 6 July 2006, the historic Silk Road passing through this territory via the Nathu La pass was reopened. Both sides have agreed to resolve the issues by peaceful means.

In October 2011, it was stated that India and China will formulate a border mechanism to handle different perceptions as to the LAC and resume the bilateral army exercises between the Indian and Chinese army from early 2012.[53][54]

Military Awards

Param Vir Chakra

      This along with the *, indicates that the Param Vir Chakra was awarded posthumously.

Name Unit Date of action Conflict Place of action Citations
Dhan Singh Thapa 8 Gorkha Rifles Sino-Indian War Ladakh, J & K, India [55][56]

[57]

Joginder Singh Sahnan Sikh Regiment * Sino-Indian War Tongpen La, NEFA, India [55][56][58]
Shaitan Singh Kumaon Regiment * Sino-Indian War Rezang La, J & K, India [55][56][59]

In popular culture

See also

Notes

References

  1. ^ Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English language: Chronology of Major Dates in History, page 1686. Dilithium Press Ltd., 1989
  2. ^ China won, but never wanted, Sino-Indian war – Global Times Archived 23 September 2016 at the Wayback Machine.
  3. ^ India lost war with China but won Arunachal's heart – Times of India Archived 30 November 2016 at the Wayback Machine.
  4. ^ أ ب ت ث ج ح خ د Garver, John W. (2006), "China’s Decision for War with India in 1962", in Robert S. Ross, New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, ISBN 978-0-8047-5363-0, Archived from the original on 28 August 2017, http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/china%20decision%20for%201962%20war%202003.pdf 
  5. ^ "1969: Liu Shaoqi dies under torture". ExecutedToday. 2013-11-12. In 1959 Liu succeeded Mao as President of the People’s Republic of China, and led the walkback from the Great Leap’s destructive stab at modernization.
  6. ^ أ ب خطأ استشهاد: وسم <ref> غير صحيح؛ لا نص تم توفيره للمراجع المسماة Wortzel
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  9. ^ "Indo-China War of 1962". globalseurity.org. Archived from the original on 13 July 2017.
  10. ^ أ ب ت ث ج ح خ د ذ Calvin, James Barnard (April 1984). "The China-India Border War". Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Archived from the original on 11 November 2011. Retrieved 15 October 2011.
  11. ^ خطأ استشهاد: وسم <ref> غير صحيح؛ لا نص تم توفيره للمراجع المسماة Chushul
  12. ^ Maxwell, India's China War 1970, p. 24.
  13. ^ The Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan. 1960), pp. 96–125, قالب:JSTOR.
  14. ^ Maxwell, India's China War 1970, p. 25–26.
  15. ^ Maxwell, India's China War 1970, p. 26.
  16. ^ أ ب ت ث ج ح خ د خطأ استشهاد: وسم <ref> غير صحيح؛ لا نص تم توفيره للمراجع المسماة officialhistory
  17. ^ Verma, Virendra Sahai (2006). "Sino-Indian Border Dispute At Aksai Chin – A Middle Path For Resolution" (PDF). Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies. 25 (3): 6–8. ISSN 1651-9728. Retrieved 30 August 2013.
  18. ^ أ ب ت ث ج خطأ استشهاد: وسم <ref> غير صحيح؛ لا نص تم توفيره للمراجع المسماة Neville_Maxwell
  19. ^ خطأ استشهاد: وسم <ref> غير صحيح؛ لا نص تم توفيره للمراجع المسماة The Un-Negotiated Dispute
  20. ^ أ ب Guruswamy, Mohan (23 June 2003), "The Great India-China Game", Rediff News, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jun/20spec.htm 
  21. ^ أ ب ت خطأ استشهاد: وسم <ref> غير صحيح؛ لا نص تم توفيره للمراجع المسماة Noorani
  22. ^ أ ب A.G. Noorani, "Perseverance in peace process Archived 26 March 2005 at the Wayback Machine.", India's National Magazine, 29 August 2003.
  23. ^ أ ب Chinese deception and Nehru's naivete led to 62 War Archived 11 April 2010 at the Wayback Machine. Times of India
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  31. ^ Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground 1963, p. 99.
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Bibliography

Further reading

  • Michael Brecher, "Non-alignment under stress: The West and the India-China border war." Pacific Affairs 52.4 (1979): 612–630. Online
  • Brigadier John Dalvi. Himalayan Blunder Natraj Publishers
  • Garver, John W. (2011), Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, University of Washington Press, ISBN 978-0-295-80120-9, https://books.google.com/books?id=TOVaMckcO0MC 
  • Li, Mingjiang; "Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63." Cold War History 11.3 (2011): 387-419.
  • David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy – Oxford University Press, 2011 – 425 p. – ISBN 9780199552023
  • Lamb, Alastair (1964). The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. L. Oxford University Press.
  • Gunnar Myrdal. Asian Drama; An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations. New York: Random House, 1968
  • History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B. Sinha, A.A. Athale, with S.N. Prasad, chief editor, History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992. — Official Indian history of the Sino-Indian War.
  • Allen S. Whiting. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina.
  • The Sino-Indian Boundary Question [Enlarged Edition], Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1962
  • The History of Counterattack Action on Sino-Indian Border(中印边境自卫反击作战史), Military science publishing house, Beijing.

External links