مذهب المنفعة

سلسلة النفعية،
جزء من سلسلة السياسة
بوابة:السياسة

مذهب المنفعة Utilitarianism نظرية أخلاقية غربية تربط بين صحة السلوك ونتائجه. طور هذه النظرية الفلاسفة البريطانيون جرمي بنتام، وجيمس ميل، وجون ستيوارت ميل، في القرنين الثامن عشر والتاسع عشر الميلاديين.

يعتقد مؤيدو هذا المذهب بأن الفعل يكون أخلاقيًا، إذا قاد إلى تحقيق نتائج أحسن. ويتناقض هذا الاعتقاد مع المبادئ الإسلامية التي تقول بأن السلوك الأخلاقي يتبع مبادئ معينة، حتى وإن أدى إلى نتائج غير مرضية على المستوى الشخصي. أراد مؤيدو مذهب المنفعة، أن يستبدلوا بالتعصب الشديد للمبادئ، مبادئ أكثر مرونة، تسمح للناس باتباع أي سلوك يؤدي إلى أفضل النتائج.

يختلف بعض مؤيدي المذهب، في إيمانهم بالوسائل، التي قد تحقق نتائج مرضية، أم غير مرضية. ويعتقد بينثام، بأن السرور والسعادة هما الأفضل بذاتهما، بينما الألم والشقاء هما قاعدة الشر. وأن السلوك الصحيح، هو الذي يؤدي لأكبر قدر من السعادة، لأكبر عدد من الناس. ويرى مؤيدون آخرون، أن هناك أشياء أخرى جميلة بجانب السرور، وهي المعرفة، والحب، والحرية.

حاول بينثام، إيجاد طريقة لقياس قيمة السلوك. وحاول تطبيق نظريته في السياسة، مطالبًا الحكومات بأن تعمل لرفاهية شعوبها. وتُعد نظـرية بينثام، شكلاً أوليًا من طريقة تحليل الربح والتكلفة، التي تُستخدم الآن بكثرة في السياسة والاقتصاد.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

تاريخ

Pre-modern formulations

The importance of happiness as an end for humans has long been recognized. Forms of hedonism were put forward by the ancient Greek philosophers Aristippus and Epicurus. Aristotle argued that eudaimonia is the highest human good. Augustine wrote that "all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness". The idea that conduct should to be judged by its consequences also existed within the ancient world. Consequentialist theories were first developed by the ancient Chinese philosopher Mozi, who proposed a system that sought to maximize benefit and eliminate harm.[1] Mohist consequentialism advocated communitarian moral goods, including political stability, population growth, and wealth, but did not support the utilitarian notion of maximizing individual happiness.[2]

Utilitarian ideas can also be found in the work of medieval philosophers. In medieval India, the 8th-century Indian philosopher Śāntideva wrote that we ought "to stop all the present and future pain and suffering of all sentient beings, and to bring about all present and future pleasure and happiness."[3] In medieval Europe, happiness was explored in depth by Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologica.[4][5][6][7][8] During the Renaissance, consequentialist ideas are present in the work of political philosophy of Niccolò Machiavelli.

القرن 18

Utilitarianism as a distinct ethical position only emerged in the 18th century, and although it is usually thought to have begun with Jeremy Bentham, there were earlier writers who presented theories that were strikingly similar.

هتشسون

Francis Hutcheson first introduced a key utilitarian phrase in An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725): when choosing the most moral action, the amount of virtue in a particular action is proportionate to the number of people it brings happiness to.[9] In the same way, moral evil, or vice, is proportionate to the number of people made to suffer. The best action is the one that procures the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers, and the worst is the one that causes the most misery. In the first three editions of the book, Hutcheson included various mathematical algorithms "to compute the Morality of any Actions." In doing so, he pre-figured the hedonic calculus of Bentham.

جون گاي

Some claim that John Gay developed the first systematic theory of utilitarian ethics.[10] In Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality (1731), Gay argues that:[11]

happiness, private happiness, is the proper or ultimate end of all our actions... each particular action may be said to have its proper and peculiar end…(but)…they still tend or ought to tend to something farther; as is evident from hence, viz. that a man may ask and expect a reason why either of them are pursued: now to ask the reason of any action or pursuit, is only to enquire into the end of it: but to expect a reason, i.e. an end, to be assigned for an ultimate end, is absurd. To ask why I pursue happiness, will admit of no other answer than an explanation of the terms.

This pursuit of happiness is given a theological basis:[12]

Now it is evident from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness: therefore that my behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the happiness of mankind, should be such...thus the will of God is the immediate criterion of Virtue, and the happiness of mankind the criterion of the will of God; and therefore the happiness of mankind may be said to be the criterion of virtue, but once removed…(and)…I am to do whatever lies in my power towards promoting the happiness of mankind.

هيوم

In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), David Hume writes:[13]

In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs, we retract our first sentiment, and adjust anew the boundaries of moral good and evil.

پالي

Modern Utilitarianism by Thomas Rawson Birks 1874

Gay's theological utilitarianism was developed and popularized by William Paley. It has been claimed that Paley was not a very original thinker and that the philosophies in his treatise on ethics is "an assemblage of ideas developed by others and is presented to be learned by students rather than debated by colleagues."[14] Nevertheless, his book The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785) was a required text at Cambridge[14] and Smith (1954) says that Paley's writings were "once as well known in American colleges as were the readers and spellers of William McGuffey and Noah Webster in the elementary schools."[15] Schneewind (1977) writes that "utilitarianism first became widely known in England through the work of William Paley."[16]

The now-forgotten significance of Paley can be judged from the title of Thomas Rawson Birks's 1874 work Modern Utilitarianism or the Systems of Paley, Bentham and Mill Examined and Compared.

Apart from restating that happiness as an end is grounded in the nature of God, Paley also discusses the place of rules, writing:[17]

[A]ctions are to be estimated by their tendency. Whatever is expedient, is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it.

But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions, in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful.… The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right.

To see this point perfectly, it must be observed that the bad consequences of actions are twofold, particular and general. The particular bad consequence of an action, is the mischief which that single action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad consequence is, the violation of some necessary or useful general rule.…

You cannot permit one action and forbid another, without showing a difference between them. Consequently, the same sort of actions must be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the general permission of them would be pernicious, it becomes necessary to lay down and support the rule which generally forbids them.

مذهب المنفعة الكلاسيكي

جرمي بنتام

Bentham's book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation was printed in 1780 but not published until 1789. It is possible that Bentham was spurred on to publish after he saw the success of Paley's Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy.[18] Though Bentham's book was not an immediate success,[19] his ideas were spread further when Pierre Étienne Louis Dumont translated edited selections from a variety of Bentham's manuscripts into French. Traité de législation civile et pénale was published in 1802 and then later retranslated back into English by Hildreth as The Theory of Legislation, although by this time significant portions of Dumont's work had already been retranslated and incorporated into Sir John Bowring's edition of Bentham's works, which was issued in parts between 1838 and 1843.

Perhaps aware that Francis Hutcheson eventually removed his algorithms for calculating the greatest happiness because they "appear'd useless, and were disagreeable to some readers,"[20] Bentham contends that there is nothing novel or unwarranted about his method, for "in all this there is nothing but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable to."

Rosen (2003) warns that descriptions of utilitarianism can bear "little resemblance historically to utilitarians like Bentham and J. S. Mill" and can be more "a crude version of act utilitarianism conceived in the twentieth century as a straw man to be attacked and rejected."[21] It is a mistake to think that Bentham is not concerned with rules. His seminal work is concerned with the principles of legislation and the hedonic calculus is introduced with the words "Pleasures then, and the avoidance of pains, are the ends that the legislator has in view." In Chapter VII, Bentham says: "The business of government is to promote the happiness of the society, by punishing and rewarding.... In proportion as an act tends to disturb that happiness, in proportion as the tendency of it is pernicious, will be the demand it creates for punishment."


. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

مبدأ المنفعة

Bentham's work opens with a statement of the principle of utility:[22]

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do.… By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.

Hedonic calculus

In Chapter IV, Bentham introduces a method of calculating the value of pleasures and pains, which has come to be known as the hedonic calculus. Bentham says that the value of a pleasure or pain, considered by itself, can be measured according to its intensity, duration, certainty/uncertainty and propinquity/remoteness. In addition, it is necessary to consider "the tendency of any act by which it is produced" and, therefore, to take account of the act's fecundity, or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind and its purity, or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind. Finally, it is necessary to consider the extent, or the number of people affected by the action.

Evils of the first and second order

The question then arises as to when, if at all, it might be legitimate to break the law. This is considered in The Theory of Legislation, where Bentham distinguishes between evils of the first and second order. Those of the first order are the more immediate consequences; those of the second are when the consequences spread through the community causing "alarm" and "danger".

It is true there are cases in which, if we confine ourselves to the effects of the first order, the good will have an incontestable preponderance over the evil. Were the offence considered only under this point of view, it would not be easy to assign any good reasons to justify the rigour of the laws. Every thing depends upon the evil of the second order; it is this which gives to such actions the character of crime, and which makes punishment necessary. Let us take, for example, the physical desire of satisfying hunger. Let a beggar, pressed by hunger, steal from a rich man's house a loaf, which perhaps saves him from starving, can it be possible to compare the good which the thief acquires for himself, with the evil which the rich man suffers?... It is not on account of the evil of the first order that it is necessary to erect these actions into offences, but on account of the evil of the second order.[23]

جون ستوارت ميل

Mill was brought up as a Benthamite with the explicit intention that he would carry on the cause of utilitarianism.[24] Mill's book Utilitarianism first appeared as a series of three articles published in Fraser's Magazine in 1861 and was reprinted as a single book in 1863.[25][26]

الملذات العليا والدُنيا

Mill rejects a purely quantitative measurement of utility and says:[27]

It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

The word utility is used to mean general well-being or happiness, and Mill's view is that utility is the consequence of a good action. Utility, within the context of utilitarianism, refers to people performing actions for social utility. With social utility, he means the well-being of many people. Mill's explanation of the concept of utility in his work, Utilitarianism, is that people really do desire happiness, and since each individual desires their own happiness, it must follow that all of us desire the happiness of everyone, contributing to a larger social utility. Thus, an action that results in the greatest pleasure for the utility of society is the best action, or as Jeremy Bentham, the founder of early Utilitarianism put it, as the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Mill not only viewed actions as a core part of utility, but as the directive rule of moral human conduct. The rule being that we should only be committing actions that provide pleasure to society. This view of pleasure was hedonistic, as it pursued the thought that pleasure is the highest good in life. This concept was adopted by Bentham and can be seen in his works. According to Mill, good actions result in pleasure, and that there is no higher end than pleasure. Mill says that good actions lead to pleasure and define good character. Better put, the justification of character, and whether an action is good or not, is based on how the person contributes to the concept of social utility. In the long run the best proof of a good character is good actions; and resolutely refuse to consider any mental disposition as good, of which the predominant tendency is to produce bad conduct. In the last chapter of Utilitarianism, Mill concludes that justice, as a classifying factor of our actions (being just or unjust) is one of the certain moral requirements, and when the requirements are all regarded collectively, they are viewed as greater according to this scale of "social utility" as Mill puts it.

He also notes that, contrary to what its critics might say, there is "no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect ... a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation." However, he accepts that this is usually because the intellectual pleasures are thought to have circumstantial advantages, i.e. "greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, &c." Instead, Mill will argue that some pleasures are intrinsically better than others.

The accusation that hedonism is a "doctrine worthy only of swine" has a long history. In Nicomachean Ethics (Book 1 Chapter 5), Aristotle says that identifying the good with pleasure is to prefer a life suitable for beasts. The theological utilitarians had the option of grounding their pursuit of happiness in the will of God; the hedonistic utilitarians needed a different defence. Mill's approach is to argue that the pleasures of the intellect are intrinsically superior to physical pleasures.

Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. ... A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. ... It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question...[28]

Mill argues that if people who are "competently acquainted" with two pleasures show a decided preference for one even if it be accompanied by more discontent and "would not resign it for any quantity of the other," then it is legitimate to regard that pleasure as being superior in quality. Mill recognizes that these "competent judges" will not always agree, and states that, in cases of disagreement, the judgment of the majority is to be accepted as final. Mill also acknowledges that "many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher." Mill says that this appeal to those who have experienced the relevant pleasures is no different from what must happen when assessing the quantity of pleasure, for there is no other way of measuring "the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations." "It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly-endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constitute, is imperfect."[29]

Mill also thinks that "intellectual pursuits have value out of proportion to the amount of contentment or pleasure (the mental state) that they produce."[30] Mill also says that people should pursue these grand ideals, because if they choose to have gratification from petty pleasures, "some displeasure will eventually creep in. We will become bored and depressed."[31] Mill claims that gratification from petty pleasures only gives short-term happiness and, subsequently, worsens the individual who may feel that his life lacks happiness, since the happiness is transient. Whereas, intellectual pursuits give long-term happiness because they provide the individual with constant opportunities throughout the years to improve his life, by benefiting from accruing knowledge. Mill views intellectual pursuits as "capable of incorporating the 'finer things' in life" while petty pursuits do not achieve this goal.[32] Mill is saying that intellectual pursuits give the individual the opportunity to escape the constant depression cycle since these pursuits allow them to achieve their ideals, while petty pleasures do not offer this. Although debate persists about the nature of Mill's view of gratification, this suggests bifurcation in his position.

'Proving' the principle of utility

In Chapter Four of Utilitarianism, Mill considers what proof can be given for the principle of utility:[33]

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it.… In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it.… No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness…we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.

It is usual to say that Mill is committing a number of fallacies:[34]

  • naturalistic fallacy: Mill is trying to deduce what people ought to do from what they in fact do;
  • equivocation fallacy: Mill moves from the fact that (1) something is desirable, i.e. is capable of being desired, to the claim that (2) it is desirable, i.e. that it ought to be desired; and
  • the fallacy of composition: the fact that people desire their own happiness does not imply that the aggregate of all persons will desire the general happiness.

Such allegations began to emerge in Mill's lifetime, shortly after the publication of Utilitarianism, and persisted for well over a century, though the tide has been turning in recent discussions. Nonetheless, a defence of Mill against all three charges, with a chapter devoted to each, can be found in Necip Fikri Alican's Mill's Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill's Notorious Proof (1994). This is the first, and remains[when?] the only, book-length treatment of the subject matter. Yet the alleged fallacies in the proof continue to attract scholarly attention in journal articles and book chapters.

Hall (1949) and Popkin (1950) defend Mill against this accusation pointing out that he begins Chapter Four by asserting that "questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptation of the term" and that this is "common to all first principles".[35][34] Therefore, according to Hall and Popkin, Mill does not attempt to "establish that what people do desire is desirable but merely attempts to make the principles acceptable."[34] The type of "proof" Mill is offering "consists only of some considerations which, Mill thought, might induce an honest and reasonable man to accept utilitarianism."[34]

Having claimed that people do, in fact, desire happiness, Mill now has to show that it is the only thing they desire. Mill anticipates the objection that people desire other things such as virtue. He argues that whilst people might start desiring virtue as a means to happiness, eventually, it becomes part of someone's happiness and is then desired as an end in itself.

The principle of utility does not mean that any given pleasure, as music, for instance, or any given exemption from pain, as for example health, are to be looked upon as means to a collective something termed happiness, and to be desired on that account. They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end. Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end, but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness.[36]

We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which is mankind are capable; we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all humans beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.[37]


. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Henry Sidgwick

Sidgwick's book The Methods of Ethics has been referred to as the peak or culmination of classical utilitarianism.[38][39][40] His main goal in this book is to ground utilitarianism in the principles of common-sense morality and thereby dispense with the doubts of his predecessors that these two are at odds with each other.[39] For Sidgwick, ethics is about which actions are objectively right.[38] Our knowledge of right and wrong arises from common-sense morality, which lacks a coherent principle at its core.[41] The task of philosophy in general and ethics in particular is not so much to create new knowledge but to systematize existing knowledge.[42] Sidgwick tries to achieve this by formulating methods of ethics, which he defines as rational procedures "for determining right conduct in any particular case".[39] He identifies three methods: intuitionism, which involves various independently valid moral principles to determine what ought to be done, and two forms of hedonism, in which rightness only depends on the pleasure and pain following from the action. Hedonism is subdivided into egoistic hedonism, which only takes the agent's own well-being into account, and universal hedonism or utilitarianism, which is concerned with everyone's well-being.[42][39]

Intuitionism holds that we have intuitive, i.e. non-inferential, knowledge of moral principles, which are self-evident to the knower.[42] The criteria for this type of knowledge include that they are expressed in clear terms, that the different principles are mutually consistent with each other and that there is expert consensus on them. According to Sidgwick, commonsense moral principles fail to pass this test, but there are some more abstract principles that pass it, like that "what is right for me must be right for all persons in precisely similar circumstances" or that "one should be equally concerned with all temporal parts of one's life".[39][42] The most general principles arrived at this way are all compatible with utilitarianism, which is why Sidgwick sees a harmony between intuitionism and utilitarianism.[40] There are also less general intuitive principles, like the duty to keep one's promises or to be just, but these principles are not universal and there are cases where different duties stand in conflict with each other. Sidgwick suggests that we resolve such conflicts in a utilitarian fashion by considering the consequences of the conflicting actions.[39][43]

The harmony between intuitionism and utilitarianism is a partial success in Sidgwick's overall project, but he sees full success impossible since egoism, which he considers as equally rational, cannot be reconciled with utilitarianism unless religious assumptions are introduced.[39] Such assumptions, for example, the existence of a personal God who rewards and punishes the agent in the afterlife, could reconcile egoism and utilitarianism.[42] But without them, we have to admit a "dualism of practical reason" that constitutes a "fundamental contradiction" in our moral consciousness.[38]

انظر أيضًا

قالب:Ideology-small

الهامش

  1. ^ Fraser, Chris (2016). The Philosophy of the Mòzĭ: The First Consequentialists. Columbia University Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-0-23-152059-1.
  2. ^ Fraser, Chris (2011). The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 62. ISBN 978-0-19-532899-8.
  3. ^ Goodman, Charles. 2016. "Śāntideva", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 31 August 2020.
  4. ^ "SUMMA THEOLOGICA: Man's last end (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 1)". newadvent.org.
  5. ^ "SUMMA THEOLOGICA: Things in which man's happiness consists (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 2)". newadvent.org.
  6. ^ "SUMMA THtheEOLOGICA: What is happiness (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 3)". newadvent.org.
  7. ^ "SUMMA THEOLOGICA: Things that are required for happiness (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 4)". newadvent.org.
  8. ^ "SUMMA THEOLOGICA: The attainment of happiness (Prima Secundae Partis, Q. 5)". newadvent.org.
  9. ^ Hutcheson, Francis (2002) [1725]. "The Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue". In Schneewind, J. B. (ed.). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. p. 515. ISBN 978-0-521-00304-9.
  10. ^ Ashcraft, Richard (1991) John Locke: Critical Assessments (Critical assessments of leading political philosophers), Routledge, p. 691
  11. ^ Gay, John (2002). "Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality". In Schneewind, J. B. (ed.). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. p. 408. ISBN 978-0-521-00304-9.
  12. ^ Gay, John (2002). "Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality". In Schneewind, J. B. (ed.). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. pp. 404–05. ISBN 978-0-521-00304-9.
  13. ^ Hume, David (2002). "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals". In Schneewind, J. B. (ed.). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. p. 552. ISBN 978-0-521-00304-9.
  14. ^ أ ب Schneewind, J. B. (2002). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. p. 446. ISBN 978-0-521-00304-9.
  15. ^ Smith, Wilson (July 1954). "William Paley's Theological Utilitarianism in America". William and Mary Quarterly. 3rd Series. 11 (3): 402–24. doi:10.2307/1943313. JSTOR 1943313.
  16. ^ Schneewind, J. B. (1977). Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 122. ISBN 978-0-19-824552-0.
  17. ^ Paley, William (2002). "The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy". In Schneewind, J. B. (ed.). Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. Cambridge University Press. pp. 455–56. ISBN 978-0-521-00304-9.
  18. ^ Rosen, Frederick. 2003. Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge. p. 132.
  19. ^ Schneewind, J. B. 1977. Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 122.
  20. ^ Hutcheson, Francis. 1726. "Introduction." In An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue.
  21. ^ Rosen, Frederick. 2003. Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge. p. 32.
  22. ^ Bentham, Jeremy. 1780. "Of The Principle of Utility." Pp. 1–6 in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: T. Payne and Sons. (Also available as eText, Wikisource). p. 1.
  23. ^ Bentham, Jeremy; Dumont, Etienne; Hildreth, R (November 2005). Theory of Legislation: Translated from the French of Etienne Dumont. Adamant Media Corporation. p. 58. ISBN 978-1-4021-7034-8.
  24. ^ Halevy, Elie (1966). The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism. Beacon Press. pp. 282–84. ISBN 978-0-19-101020-0.
  25. ^ Hinman, Lawrence (2012). Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory. Wadsworth. ISBN 978-1-133-05001-8.
  26. ^ Mill, John Stuart (2010) [1863]. Utilitarianism - Ed. Heydt (Broadview Editions). Broadview Press. p. 33. ISBN 978-1-55111-501-6. Retrieved 2019-07-28.
  27. ^ Mill, John Stuart (1998). Crisp, Roger (ed.). Utilitarianism. Oxford University Press. p. 56. ISBN 978-0-19-875163-2.
  28. ^ Mill, John Stuart (1998). Crisp, Roger (ed.). Utilitarianism. Oxford University Press. pp. 56–57. ISBN 978-0-19-875163-2.
  29. ^ John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2
  30. ^ Brink, David. [2007] 2018. "Mill Moral and Political Philosophy." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 5 July 2020.
  31. ^ Hauskeller, Michael (2011). "No Philosophy for Swine: John Stuart Mill on the Quality of Pleasures". Utilitas. 23 (4): 428–446. doi:10.1017/S0953820811000264. hdl:10871/9381. S2CID 170099688.
  32. ^ Saunders, Ben. 2010. "J. S. Mill's Conception of Utility." Utilitas 22(1):52–69. DOI:10.1017/S0953820809990380. ProQuest 200183451.
  33. ^ Mill, John Stuart (1998). Crisp, Roger (ed.). Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 81. ISBN 978-0-19-875163-2.
  34. ^ أ ب ت ث Popkin, Richard H. (1950). "A Note on the 'Proof' of Utility in J. S. Mill". Ethics. 61: 66–68. doi:10.1086/290751. S2CID 170936711.
  35. ^ Hall, Everett W. (1949). "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Mill". Ethics. 60: 1–18. doi:10.1086/290691. S2CID 145767787.
  36. ^ Mill, John Stuart (1998). Crisp, Roger (ed.). Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 82. ISBN 978-0-19-875163-2.
  37. ^ Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2.
  38. ^ أ ب ت Schultz, Barton (2020). "Henry Sidgwick". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Retrieved 29 December 2020.
  39. ^ أ ب ت ث ج ح خ Craig, Edward (1996). "Sidgwick, Henry". Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
  40. ^ أ ب Honderich, Ted (2005). "Sidgwick, Henry". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  41. ^ Duignan, Brian; West, Henry R. "Utilitarianism". Encyclopedia Britannica (in الإنجليزية). Retrieved 29 December 2020.
  42. ^ أ ب ت ث ج Borchert, Donald M. (2006). "Sidgwick, Henry". Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. Macmillan.
  43. ^ Borchert, Donald M. (2006). "Sidgwick, Henry [Addendum]". Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition. Macmillan.

المصادر والاستزادة

  • Cornman, James, et al. Philosophical Problems and Arguments - An Introduction, 4th edition Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992.
  • Harwood, Sterling, "Eleven Objections to Utilitarianism," in Louis P. Pojman, ed., Moral Philosophy: A Reader, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003), and in Sterling Harwood, ed., Business as Ethical and Business as Usual, Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1996, Chapter 7.
  • Lyons, David, "Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism". Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.
  • Martin, Michael, "A Utilitarian Kantian Principle," Philosophical Studies, (with H. Ruf), 21, 1970, pp. 90–91.
  • Rosen, Frederick (2003). Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill. Routledge, p. 28. ISBN 0415220947
  • Silverstein, Harry S. A Defence of Cornman’s Utilitarian Kantian Principle, Philosophical Studies (Dordrecht u.a.) 23, 212–215. 1972
  • Singer, Peter. The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1981. [ISBN 0-374-15112-1]
  • Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. [ISBN 0-521-43971-X]
  • Sumner, L. Wayne, Abortion: A Third Way, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

وصلات خارجية

الكلمات الدالة: