نظرية الردع

يشير هذا المقال إلى نظريات الردع الخاصة بالعقاب. للنظرية القانونية للعدالة انظر ردع (قانون).

Ramses II at Kadesh.jpgGustavus Adolphus at the Battle at Breitenfeld.jpgM1A1 abrams front.jpg

التاريخ العسكري

قبل التاريخ • القديمة • الوسيطة
المعاصرة المبكرة • الصناعية • الحديثة

مجالات المعارك

جوية • معلوماتية • برية • بحرية • فضائية


مدرعات • مدفعية • بيولوجية • سلاح الفرسان
كيماوية • إلكترونية • مشاة
نووية • نفسية


استنزاف • فدائيون • مناورة
حصار • حرب شاملة • خنادق


اقتصادية • كبرى • عملياتية


التشكيلات • الرتب • الوحدات


المعدات • الذخيرة • خطوط الامداد


المعارك • القادة • العمليات
الحصارات • المنظرون • الحروب
جرائم الحرب • الأسلحة • الكتاب

The USS Growler, one of two submarines designed to provide a nuclear deterrence using cruise missiles with a 500 miles (800 km) range—placed on patrol carrying the Regulus I missile (shown at Pier 86 in New York, its home as a museum ship).

نظرية الردع Deterrence theory هي استراتيجية عسكرية ظهرت في أثناء الحرب الباردة. وهي مرتبطة بصفة خاصة بالأسلحة النووية، وتحتل حاليا مكانة بارزة في السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية فيما يتعلق بتطوير الأسلحة النووية في إيران وكوريا الشمالية.[1]

ويستخدم المصطلح بصفة عامة للإشارة إلى الاستراتيجية المحتملة، في الصراعات أي مجال، لالحاق ضرر غير مقبول، وللتأكيد للمعتدي بوجود إمكانية دفع هذا الضرر أو تجنب وقوعه.

Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires. A credible nuclear deterrent, Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959, must be always at the ready, yet never used.[2][lower-alpha 1]

In Thomas Schelling's (1966) classic work on deterrence, the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory is presented. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence.[3] Schelling says the capacity to harm another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behavior. To be coercive or deter another state, violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarized that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory, and is most successful when it is held in reserve.[3]

In 2004 Frank C. Zagare made the case that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, not empirically accurate, and that it is deficient as a theory. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for perfect deterrence, which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.[4]

In a January 2007 article in the Wall Street Journal, veteran cold-war policy makers Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Shultz, and Sam Nunn reversed their previous position and asserted that far from making the world safer, nuclear weapons had become a source of extreme risk.[5] Their rationale and conclusion was not based on the old world with only a few nuclear players, but on the instability in many states possessing the technologies and the lack of wherewithal to properly maintain and upgrade existing weapons in many states:

The risk of accidents, misjudgments or unauthorised launches, they argued, was growing more acute in a world of rivalries between relatively new nuclear states that lacked the security safeguards developed over many years by America and the Soviet Union. The emergence of pariah states, such as North Korea (possibly soon to be joined by Iran), armed with nuclear weapons was adding to the fear as was the declared ambition of terrorists to steal, buy or build a nuclear device.[5]

According to The Economist, "Senior European statesmen and women" called for further action in 2010 in addressing problems of nuclear weapons proliferation. They said: "Nuclear deterrence is a far less persuasive strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms races and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war".[6]

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مفهوم الردع

The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of international security research for at least two hundred years.[7] Research has predominantly focused on the theory of rational deterrence to analyze the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. Alternative theories however have challenged the rational deterrence theory and have focused on organizational theory and cognitive psychology.

The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.[8] A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from resorting to the threat of use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.

As outlined by Huth,[8] a policy of deterrence can fit into two broad categories being (i) preventing an armed attack against a state's own territory (known as direct deterrence); or (ii) preventing an armed attack against another state (known as extended deterrence). Situations of direct deterrence often occur when there is a territorial dispute between neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a great power becomes involved. It is the latter that has generated the majority of interest in academic literature. Building on these two broad categories, Huth goes on to outline that deterrence policies may be implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat (known as immediate deterrence) or as strategy to prevent a military conflict or short term threat from arising (known as general deterrence).

A successful deterrence policy must be considered in not only military terms, but also in political terms. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which threatens armed conflict and possibly war. The prevention of crises of wars however is not the only aim of deterrence. In addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and military demands of a potential attacking nation. If armed conflict is avoided at the price of diplomatic concessions to the maximum demands of the potential attacking nation under the threat of war, then it cannot be claimed that deterrence has succeeded.

Furthermore, as Jentleson et al.[9] argue, two key sets of factors for successful deterrence are important being (i) a defending state strategy that firstly balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibility, and secondly minimizes international and domestic constraints; and (ii) the extent of an attacking state's vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and economic conditions. In broad terms, a state wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if the costs of non-compliance it can impose on, and the benefits of compliance it can offer to, another state are greater than the benefits of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.

Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from attacking with their nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly mutually assured destruction (MAD). Nuclear deterrence can also be applied to an attack by conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch US nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks.

A successful nuclear deterrent requires that a country preserve its ability to retaliate, either by responding before its own weapons are destroyed or by ensuring a second strike capability. A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia, the جمهورية الصين الشعبية و الهند. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea- and air-based nuclear weapons.




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  1. ^ http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20070326&articleId=5184
  2. ^ Brodie, Bernard (1959), "8", "The Anatomy of Deterrence" as found in Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 264–304 
  3. ^ أ ب Since the consequence of a breakdown of the nuclear deterrence strategy is so catastrophic for human civilisation, it is reasonableness to employ the strategy only if the chance of breakdown is zero. Schelling, T. C. (1966), "2", The Diplomacy of Violence, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1–34 
  4. ^ Zagare, Frank C. (2004), Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory, 16, pp. 107–141, doi:10.1177/0951629804041117 
  5. ^ أ ب "Nuclear endgame: The growing appeal of zero". The Economist. June 16, 2011. 
  6. ^ Kåre Willoch, Kjell Magne Bondevik, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Ruud Lubbers, Jean-Luc Dehaene, Guy Verhofstadt; et al. (14 April 2010). "Nuclear progress, but dangers ahead". The Guardian. 
  7. ^ See, for example, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989)
  8. ^ أ ب Huth, P. K. (1999), Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debate, 2, pp. 25–48, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.25 
  9. ^ Jentleson, B.A.; Whytock, C.A. (2005), Who Won Libya, 30, pp. 47–86, doi:10.1162/isec.2005.30.3.47 

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