الغواصة الروسية بلگورود (K-329)

K-329-Belgorod-Sutton.jpg
التاريخ
روسيا
الاسم: K-329 بلگورود
الباني: Sevmash
أُطلِقت: April 23, 2019
الوضع: Tested at sea
السمات العامة
الفئة والنوع: Oscar II-class submarine
النوع: Special operations and Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System vector
الازاحة:
  • 14,700/17,000 tonnes surfaced
  • 24,000/30,000 tonnes submerged
الطول: 184 m (603 ft 8 in)
العارضة: 15 m (49 ft 3 in)
قدرة التركيب: 2 × pressurized water cooled reactors
الدفع: 2 pressurized water reactor OK-650M.02 nuclear reactors, 2 × steam turbines delivering 190 MW (250,000 shp) to two shafts
السرعة: 32 knots (59 km/h; 37 mph) surfaced
المدى: Unlimited supposed
التحمل: 120 days
العمق الاختباري: 500 to 520 m (1,640 to 1,710 ft) by various estimates
المرافقون: 110 sub-mariners
التسليح: 6 × Poseidon drones
ملاحظات: Home port: Severodvinsk, Russia

K-329 بلگورود ("Белгород"، Belgorod) هي غواصة نووية روسية رائدة. It has already been tested at sea with a specially trained crew and its active commissioning is expected around the end of the year 2021.[1][2]

This strategic submarine is attached to the Oscar II class (NATO designation) and is one of the last weapons systems presented by Russian President Vladimir Putin during his annual speech on March 1, 2018.

Intended for special missions, the K-329 Belgorod is part of the ru (29th Submarine Division) of the Northern Fleet, thus, its operational capacities confine it to the almost exclusive service of the ru (Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research) (GUGI), which reports directly to the Russian Defence Ministry.[3][4][5][6]

K-329 Belgorod is also identified to become the first submarine to utilize the Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System currently in the testing phase.[7]

The commissioning of the K-329 Belgorod was initially scheduled for the end of 2020. However, with the accident on board the submarine Losharik in July 2019,[8][9] it became clear that the active commissioning would be postponed to at least 2021. A press report (April 2021) from the STASS agency indicates a new objective from the Russian Defense Ministry to send the K-329 into service in the Pacific zone.[10] This information could confirm the problems encountered with the submarine Losharik and the shift to the background of the operations envisaged on the Arctic continental shelf.[11][12][13]

The latest information (Fri 30 April 2021 ) provided by the specialist, H I Sutton, indicates that the K-329 Belgorod has recently returned to the construction hall.[14]She was reported to have started builders sea trials on June 25, 2021.[15]

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Construction

The construction of Belgorod began in July 1992 in the yards of the shipbuilder Sevmash, in the port city of Severodvinsk. The initial tactical number was assigned as K-139, and remained so for many years before being changed to K-329. The name was assigned in 1993: the "Belgorod" ("Белгород").

In 1995, crew training began at the Obninsk training center, but in 1997, construction was put on hold while the submarine was three-quarters constructed, mainly for financial reasons. On January 22, 1998, the crew was dismissed.

In September 2000 - one month after the loss of the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk - it was decided to resume construction in the form of the improved 949AM project, but the question of funding remained fragile.

Another reversal of the situation occurred in July 2006, when the submarine had reached 85% of operational availability, and the military department refused to provide the credits necessary for the continuation of the site. The Department of Defense then considered other options for the completion of the shipyard, including completing and supplying the nuclear submarine cruiser for the Indian Navy, which would finance the completion of the project.

The last freeze on the construction work was officially announced on June 26, 2009. But a final reversal occurred on February 10, 2012 with the decision to complete the construction of a multipurpose nuclear submarine intended for special operations (in particular in connection with the 09852 project)[16] indeed, one of the options of the K-329 is to become the first vector of the new Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System underwater drone (Статус-6 Посейдон, named "Kanyon" by CIA). Among the other special options will be facilities allowing the reception of smaller submarine for interventions in deep waters.

Between 2013 and 2018, the construction of the K-329 was completed. The press service of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation announced on November 21, 2018 that the crew was trained and fully operational.

The K-329 Belgorod was officially launched on April 23, 2019, during a ceremony at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk.[17][18] By June 2020, one source reported it "in service",[19] though this appears to have been inaccurate. Others suggested it was still fitting out (possibly including sea trials).[9] In January 2021, the director-general of the Russian Shipbuilder Sevmash, Mikhail Budnichenko, stated that 'tests' on Belgorod were proceeding.[20][21]


السمات

مقارنة الحجم بين بلگورود و Typhoon-class submarine

التصميم

In the construction process, the original 154-meter long hull was lengthened to 184 meters (which is almost 11 meter more than the Project 941 SSBNs - the world's largest submarines ever built) with a width of 18,2 meters.[22] In June 2019, US military expert H.I. Sutton published satellite imagery[12] of the Sevmash shipyard, which shows the K-329 "Belgorod"[12] along with K-549 "Knyaz Vladimir" of the Borey project, with the Belgorod visibly longer and wider.[12]

التسليح

On November 11, 2015, the Status-6 Oceanic Multipurpose System project was officially revealed to the public.[23] The initial designation of Status-6 has since been changed to Poseidon (Russian weapon systems designation 2M39 and the NATO reporting name Kanyon has been assigned).[24]

The Poseidon type remotely operated underwater vehicle has a 10 000 km range, can dive to a depth of 1 000 meters and is designed to deliver nuclear warheads for the destruction of coastal infrastructure as a second nuclear strike option («оружия ответного удара»). The motherships for the Poseidon underwater drones are planned to be the 09852 "Belgorod" project submarines (like the "Belgorod") and the 09851 "Khabarovsk" project submarines. [25] According to publications by the Russian state news agency TASS the submarines can carry up to six Poseidon vehicles at once[26] and this view is shared by some military experts.[27][المصدر لا يؤكد ذلك]

منصة أنشطة خاصة

Some sources state that in addition to the Poseidon AUVs, the Belgorod type can also operate as the mother ship for a single nuclear-powered mini-submarine of the 18511 project, otherwise known as Paltus type (Project 1851),[12][28] used for the planting on the seabed of a self-contained mini-nuclear reactor of the ATGU 'Shelf' (АТГУ Шельф, abbreviation stands for Атомная турбогенераторная установка - Nuclear Turbo-Generator Device) type.[29] The ATGU Shelf is being developed for autonomous power generation of underwater sensor arrays and the submarine could piggy-back a single ATGU unit at a time, attached to its center deck section. The Belgorod is also planned to operate the Clavesin-2R-RM («Клавесин-2Р-РМ», clavesin is Russian for Harpsichord) unmanned underwater sensor vehicles.[30][12] The loss of the Losharik nuclear mini-submarine after a major fire in 2019 has caused a major setback for the Belgorod programme. At the same time, some sources suggest that the full entry into service of Poseidon may not occur on the submarine until around 2027.[31]


Displacement greater than 14,700 tonnes surfaced (est. 17,000 tonnes), 24,000 tonnes submerged (estimated 30,000 tonnes)
الطول ~ 184 متر
العرض ~ 15 متر
السرعة <32 عقدة
المدى غير محدود
التحمل ~4 months
Operating depth Estimated as 500–520 meters per OSCAR-II SSGN
الدفع Nuclear (2 x pressurized water reactor OK-650M.02 with a capacity of 190 MW driving two steam turbines and twin screws.)
الطاقم estimated 110
التسليح 6 x Poseidon (KANYON) nuclear torpedoes, 6 x 533 mm (21") torpedo tubes

Among the major modifications made to this submarine K-329, the tube compartment dedicated to the launch of cruise missiles has been eliminated in order to make room for a receptacle capable of accommodating mini-submarines and underwater drones (UUV dedicated to special operations such as the AS-12 Russian submarine Losharik (project 10831) or the AS-21, AS-23 and AS-35 Paltus (project 1851). Those devices options enabling intelligence and intervention operations out on the seabed.

The incapacitation of Losharik after a major fire in 2019 may have delayed the assumption of Belgorod's full special operations role. At the same time, some sources suggest that the full entry into service of Poseidon may not occur on the submarine until around 2027.[9]

الأهداف الاستراتيجية

الضربات النووية

The K-329 submarine and the Status-6 Poseidon drone are jointly part of the new weapons systems designed by Russia to respond - among other things - to the United States's new nuclear capabilities, in the context of the abandonment of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between these two countries.

المهام الخاصة والعمليات المخابراتية

Its destination for special operations means that its capabilities have been adapted to many types of missions with strategic aims. This nuclear submarine cruiser is therefore designed for adaptability, the ability to use and deliver different types of weapons or other suitable material with the assigned intelligence objective (installation actions, delicate clandestine operations).

Among these strategic aims, the desire to set up and exploit the Arctic shelf is one of the major Geostrategy objectives in the short to medium term,[13][32] this for energy issues, various surveys, or even control of maritime flows called to recompose with the melting of arctic ice. The K-329 Belgorod, a top-class submarine vessel, thus appears to be ideal for helping the Russian government to fulfill its claims on the Arctic marine space through intelligence operations and discreet and/or destructive actions in deep waters.[33]

An illustration can be established through a new project to modernize and deploy a network of sonar listening stations, positioned on the Arctic seabed (code name Harmony : Гармония).[12]

Another illustration can be noted, through the various concerns that appeared among high-ranking members of the Pentagon as well as of the NATO staff between the end of 2015 and the end of 2017, concerning the Russian plans for undersea cables for telecommunications. Indeed, an unconventional war (which can be expressed through intelligence gathering or discrete sabotage operations) can be envisaged on these very poorly protected infrastructures in the context of exacerbated tensions or even open conflict.[34][35][36][37][38]

تحليل استراتيجي عملياتي

It is notable that this nuclear weapon system with two nuclear weapons delivery components (alliance between this new K-329 Belgorod submarine and the Status-6 Poseidon drone) makes it possible to considerably amplify the advantages of the underwater delivery of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, the stealth of the initial nuclear weapons delivery (the submarine) is of course preserved, but it is supplemented by a second nuclear weapons delivery operated remotely (the drone) allowing to amply compensate for the drawbacks inherent in the underwater nuclear weapons delivery process, namely programming delicate objectives and limited powers and ranges.

Currently, the potential rivals of Russia would therefore find themselves - in the light of the state of official knowledge of operational weapon systems - in a disadvantaged position, since an operational and efficient defense system capable of countering this new type of exclusively submarine delivery of the thermonuclear weapon has not been designed yet.

To this first component of the K-329 Belgorod as a vector of weapons, is added that of a vector of specialized teams in deep waters. This submarine could thus become one of the russian major components within the framework of actions carried out on more or less large scales on submarine telecom systems, that within the framework of military action on cyberspace.[39][40]

انظر أيضاً


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الهامش

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